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What is the Actual Shape of Perception Utility? 
Krzysztof Kontek1 
 
Abstract 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, 1992) holds that the value func-
tion is described using a power function, and is concave for gains and convex for losses. These 
postulates are questioned on the basis of recently reported experiments, paradoxes (gain-loss se-
parability violation), and brain activity research. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that per-
ception utility is generally logarithmic in shape for both gains and losses, and only happens to be 
convex for losses when gains are not present in the problem context. This leads to a different 
evaluation of mixed prospects than is the case with Prospect Theory: losses are evaluated using a 
concave, rather than a convex, utility function. In this context, loss aversion appears to be nothing 
more than the result of applying a logarithmic utility function over the entire outcome domain. 
Importantly, the hypothesis enables a link to be established between perception utility and Portfo-
lio Theory (Markowitz, 1952A). This is not possible in the case of the Prospect Theory value 
function due its shape at the origin. 
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1 Introduction 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979) postulates that the value function is concave 
for gains and convex for losses. This implies that people are risk averse for gains and risk seeking 
for losses. The theory also presents loss aversion as a separate phenomenon. This reflects the 
greater weight assigned to losses than to gains of the same size. The cumulative version of the 
theory (Tversky, Kahneman, 1992) describes the value function using a power function with a 
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power coefficient α of 0.88 for both gains and losses. Loss aversion is modeled using a coeffi-
cient of λ = 2.25, meaning that people are more than twice as sensitive to losses as they are to 
gains. The theory further assumes that gains and losses are evaluated separately using respective 
value and probability weighting functions, and that the prospect value is the sum of the two. 
These well known postulates are confronted in this paper with recent experimental results. 
It turns out that a power function, reflecting “preference homogeneity” (Tversky, Kahneman, 
1992), leads to surprising failures in interpreting lotteries with increasing stakes (Point 2). Not 
only that, it makes it impossible to explain several well known paradoxes, such as the original Al-
lais paradox simultaneously with participation in lotteries (Neilson and Stowe, 2002) and the St. 
Petersburg Paradox (Blavatskyy, 2005).    
Despite increasing experimental evidence, there is additionally no consensus as to whether 
utility is convex or concave for losses (Point 3). Most people exhibit risk seeking behavior, but a 
strong minority (25% to 50%) behave in an opposite manner. Moreover, the Cumulative Prospect 
Theory conclusion that people are risk seeking for loss prospects appears to be merely the acci-
dental result of using a specific form of the probability weighting function to estimate the power 
coefficient of the value function.  
On the other hand, loss aversion appears to result from a single process which governs 
losses and gains (Point 4); it has been shown that potential losses and gains trigger decreas-
ing/increasing activity in the same region of the brain (Tom, 2007). A premise of Prospect The-
ory regarding the separate valuation of gains and losses is also questioned (Point 6). Experimental 
studies demonstrate a systematic violation of the double matching axiom, an axiom that is neces-
sary for gain-loss separability (Wu, Markle, 2008; Birnbaum, 2007). 
A new hypothesis is put forward in Point 5 of this paper to resolve these inconsistencies. It 
holds that utility is generally logarithmic in shape and only happens to be convex when gains are 
absent in the problem context. According to this hypothesis, a logarithmic perception of losses 
and gains is the default process and any “reflection” of the utility curve for losses is merely an 
exception to the rule. Several arguments confirming this statement are presented. The hypothesis 
easily explains gain-loss separability violations and leads to a different evaluation of mixed pros-
pects than that postulated by Cumulative Prospect Theory. Loss aversion appears to be simply the 
result of applying a logarithmic utility function to both losses and gains. 
The name “perception utility” for the resulting function is introduced due to its many dif-
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ferences with the Prospect Theory value function. The similarities should also be pointed out. In 
principle, they are the both psychophysical functions defined relative to a reference point. In the 
original Prospect Theory paper (1979) Kahneman and Tversky state: “Many sensory and percep-
tual dimensions share the property that the psychological response is a concave function of the 
magnitude of physical change. For example, it is easier to discriminate between a change of 3° 
and a change of 6° in room temperature, than it is to discriminate between a change of 13° and a 
change of 16°. We propose that the value function which is derived from risky choices shares the 
same characteristics”.  
The perception utility function and the value function are essentially the same concepts. 
This paper shows, however, that the two functions differ in almost every respect: the functional 
forms used to describe them, the loss aversion concept, and finally the shape for losses and gains 
considered separately and jointly. As stated in the discussion (Point 7) the hypothesis enables a 
link to be established between perception utility and Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952A). This 
is because the logarithmic function can be well approximated around 0 using the quadratic func-
tion, which is the basic assumption required to transpose the expected utility considerations into 
the return-risk plane. This transposition is not possible in case of the Prospect Theory value func-
tion due to its shape at the origin.  
2 Functional Form 
2.1 Power Function 
Let us suppose that somebody is indifferent between a certain $40 and a 50% chance of 
winning $100. The ratio of the certainty equivalent ce to the lottery outcome P is 40/100 = 0.4 in 
this case. This ratio should decrease when P becomes very large: a subject will definitely expect 
much less than a certain $40 million when confronted with a 50% chance of winning $100 mil-
lion.  
It is commonly believed these sorts of behaviors can be explained by Prospect Theory, 
more specifically by the shape of its value function. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) noticed: “The 
difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200 appears to be greater than the differ-
ence between a gain of 1,100 and a gain of 1,200. Similarly, the difference between a loss of 100 
and a loss of 200 appears greater than the difference between a loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200, 
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unless the larger loss is intolerable. Thus, we hypothesize that the value function for changes of 
wealth is normally concave above the reference point and often convex below it. That is, the mar-
ginal value of both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude”. Quite surpris-
ingly, Cumulative Prospect Theory fails to explain the case considered. The theory assumes that 
the value function is described by a power function that conforms to Stevens Law (1957), i.e.: 
 ( )v x xα=  (2.1) 
According to this theory, the weight w associated with probability p is constant. It follows 
that the indifference in the first case is described as: 
 ( )40 100 0.5wα α=  (2.2) 
Multiplying both sides of (2.2) by a constant 1,000,000α we obtain:  
 ( )40,000,000 100,000,000 0.5wα α=  (2.3) 
which describes the indifference between a certain $40 million and a 50% chance of winning 
$100 million. This means that proportional increasing lottery stakes does not change the prefer-
ence. This property of Cumulative Prospect Theory is not accidental; Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) refer to it as “preference homogeneity”. The obvious failure of the theory in the consid-
ered case can be described in a more general way. The certainty equivalent is obtained by apply-
ing the formula:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )v ce v P w p=  (2.4) 
As the value function is assumed to be a power function, the following holds: 
 ( )ce P w pα α=  (2.5) 
Hence  
 ( ) ce cew p
P P
αα
α
 = =  
 
 (2.6) 
and 
 ( )
1ce
w p
P
α=  (2.7) 
It follows that the ce/P ratio is constant for a given shape of the probability weighting 
function w, and a given power coefficient α of the value function. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
can only explain a change in preference in terms of a change in either the probability weighting 
function w or power coefficient α with respect to prospect size. The first condition would vitiate 
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the fundamental Prospect Theory assumption that probability weighting is an independent “psy-
chological” phenomenon. The second condition would imply a break in “preference homogene-
ity”. This would require a utility curve where relative risk aversion increases with outcome size, 
but this in turn would automatically exclude the power function from the list of possible func-
tional form candidates.  
The inability of the power function to explain this particular case might account for the 
other documented Cumulative Prospect Theory failures. Neilson and Stowe (2002) demonstrate 
that Cumulative Prospect Theory cannot simultaneously explain participation in lotteries and the 
original Allais paradox. Although the authors looked at different forms of the probability weight-
ing function, they only considered the power value function. Blavatskyy (2005) similarly demon-
strated that Cumulative Prospect Theory, with its power value function, cannot explain the St. Pe-
tersburg Paradox.  
2.2 Logarithmic Function 
Bernoulli stated that the St. Petersburg Paradox could be explained using logarithmic utility 
as early as 1738. This solution works even when probability weights are applied. Similarly, it can 
be verified that the original Allais Paradox can be explained together with the gambling using 
logarithms of outcomes. Scholten & Read (2010) considered similar patterns by verifying the 
Markowitz hypothesis regarding the utility shape (1952B). They stated that Prospect Theory 
could only explain preference change by assuming a value function of decreasing elasticity, in-
stead of the power function, which is of constant elasticity. They proposed using the logarithmic 
function v(x) = 1/a ln(1 + a x).  
Logarithmic perception is well known due to a fundamental law of psychophysics known 
as the Weber-Fechner law. Hearing described using the decibel scale is an example of this sort of 
perception. This law, however, has been severely criticized by Stevens (1957), who claimed that 
the power function better describes people’s perception. This way it was implemented in Prospect 
Theory. In any case, the evidence presented here shows that the power function is unable to ex-
plain many behaviors and paradoxes, whereas the logarithmic function can do this without any 
problems. Therefore, it is further assumed that perception utility is of logarithmic shape. 
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3 Perception Utility for Losses 
3.1 Utility Reflection  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observed the following behavior when making risky deci-
sions: for low probabilities, people are risk seeking for gains, and risk averse for losses, whereas 
for high probabilities, they are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. This reversed pat-
tern, which they called the “reflection effect”, supported their hypothesis regarding the convex-
concave shape of the value function.  
It should, however, be pointed out that the “reflection effect” does not necessarily imply a 
reverse shape of the value function. According to Prospect Theory, probability weighting typi-
cally has a stronger impact on risky decisions than does the utility shape. The theory thus ex-
plains gambling despite the concave utility function for gains. Risky decisions for losses can li-
kewise be explained, even when a moderately concave utility function is assumed. Such utility 
would only attenuate the risk seeking attitude postulated by the probability weighting function for 
high probabilities. In any case, the convex-concave shape of the value function remained one of 
the main postulates of Prospect Theory. 
The appearance of the cumulative version of Prospect Theory seemed to confirm this as-
sumption. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) derived a power coefficient of 0.88 for both gains and 
losses using experimental data. This implies concavity for gains and convexity for losses – ex-
actly what the original Prospect Theory predicted.  
3.2 Mixed Evidence for Losses 
Although the value function is well documented to be concave for gains, it is, however, 
not all that clear that it is convex for losses, as postulated by Prospect Theory. Van de Kuilen in 
his dissertation (2007) summarizes the research on the subject: “First of all, there is no consensus 
at present about the fundamental question whether the utility function for losses is convex or con-
cave. Some studies found concave utility for losses (Davidson, Suppes & Siegel 1957; Laury & 
Holt 2000 (for real incentives only)), while other studies found convex utility for losses (Currim 
& Sarin 1989; Tversky & Kahneman 1992; Abdellaoui 2000; Etchart-Vincent 2004). Second, 
some studies did not only find convex utility for losses but also found more pronounced convexity 
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for losses than concavity for gains (Fishburn & Kochenberger 1979; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & 
Paraschiv 2004), and this constitutes another point of debate since other studies found that con-
vexity for losses is less pronounced than concavity for gains (Fennema & van Assen 1999; Köb-
berling, Schwieren & Wakker 2004; Abdellaoui, Vosmann & Weber, 2005). Finally, there is no 
consensus on whether utility curvature is more (or less) pronounced for larger outcomes. In-
creasing relative risk aversion has been found, for example, by Kachelmeier & Shehata (1992), 
Holt & Laury (2002, 2005), and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes & Rustrom (2003), whereas the 
opposite result, i.e. a decreasing relative risk aversion coefficient, has been found, for example, 
by Friend & Blume (1979), and Blake (1996)”.  
Other research, not listed above, shows that either convexity prevails (Pennings and 
Smidts, 2003), or that the utility is concave (Fehr-Duhda et al. 2006). Also in Lattimore, Baker 
and Witte (1992), most individuals’ utility functions appear to be either concave or linear.  Libby 
and Fishburn (1977) and Laughhunn, Payne and Crum (1980) state that even though decision 
makers appear partial to risk in the loss domain, they tend to become risk averse as the losses at 
stake become large. A similar pattern was observed by Etchart-Vincent (2009): “Even though 
most elicited individual utility functions classically appear to be either concave or convex (most 
of them being convex), a strong minority of them (25%) tends to exhibit a concave-convex shape, 
with convexity over moderate losses changing to concavity as losses grow”. Even more complex 
patterns were described by Scholten and Read (2010), who replicated the Markowitz (1952B) ex-
periment: “For gains, most people change from risk seeking to risk aversion as the stakes in-
crease, consistent with Markowitz’s hypothesis. For losses, the results are diverse: Some change 
from risk aversion to risk seeking, others change in the opposite direction, and still others are 
globally risk averse”. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) summarized recent research: “At the aggregate level, all (authors) 
found slightly convex utility for losses (median power coefﬁcients vary between 0.84 and 0.97). At 
the individual level, the most common pattern was convex utility for losses (between 24% and 
47% of the subjects), but concave and linear utility functions were also common”. The authors 
presented their own results which indicated a slight convexity for losses. However, Abdellaoui et 
al. (2008) presented other research which contradicted their previous conclusion. The power co-
efficient was stated to assume a value of 1.06, implying a concave utility function for losses. 
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3.3 Are People Really Risk Seeking for Losses?   
 The differences between these conclusions may partially be accounted for by the experi-
mental design and data analysis method used. We will demonstrate that the Cumulative Prospect 
Theory conclusion that people are risk seeking for loss prospects appears to be merely an acci-
dental result of using a specific form of the probability weighting function to estimate the power 
factor of the value function.  
A standard nonlinear regression procedure was applied to the experimental data presented 
in the Cumulative Prospect Theory paper (1992). Using the functional form of the probability 
weighting function postulated by Cumulative Prospect Theory results in parameter values α = 
0.906 and δ = 0.704. These values are similar to those presented by Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(α = 0.88 and δ = 0.69). The power factor α being less than 1 implies the convexity of the value 
function for losses, and would mean that people are risk seeking in this case.  
The drawback of the form proposed by Cumulative Prospect Theory is that it only has a 
single parameter to model the shape of the probability weighting function. More flexible, two–
parameter functions have been used to check whether the functional form of the probability 
weighting function has an impact on the result of the power factor estimation (γ and δ denote pa-
rameters):  
a). The form used by Gonzales and Wu (1999) 
 
( )1
p
GW
p p
γ
γγ
δ
δ
=
+ −
 (3.1) 
b). The form proposed by Prelec (1998) 
 
( )ln p
PR e
γδ− −=  (3.2) 
c). Cumulative Beta Distribution 
 ( ),pBT I δ γ=  (3.3) 
where I denotes the beta regularized function. 
d). Cumulative Kumaraswamy Distribution  
 ( )1 1KM p γδ= − −  (3.4) 
These power factor estimations for losses are presented in Table 3.1. 
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 KT GW PR BT KM 
α (0.88 for CPT) 0.906 1.06 1.04 1.10 1.09 
St. error 3.43 2.69 3.00 2.73 2.69 
Table 3.1 Estimation of α for loss prospects using different forms of the probability weighting function with 
the corresponding standard errors of certainty equivalent estimation. 
As presented, the power factor is only ever less than 1 when the form of the probability 
weighting function proposed by Cumulative Prospect Theory is used. In every other case, it is 
greater than 1. As shown, the standard error of estimation is greatest in the case of the function 
proposed by CPT. Using other forms results in much lower errors, indicating that these models 
better fit the experimental data and that their estimations of α are more reliable.  
This result demonstrates that the “reflection” of the value function is not confirmed by the 
CPT experimental data. The value function appears to be concave for losses (similarly as for 
gains), once more flexible functions are used to model the probability weighting function. It fol-
lows that people are generally risk averse both for gains and for losses. This contradicts one of 
the fundamental claims of Prospect Theory.  
This result not only presents a different interpretation of the Cumulative Prospect Theory 
data, it confirms the general conclusion that very different behaviors are observed in the loss do-
main. The nature of this phenomenon has never been satisfactorily explained. We shall attempt to 
remedy this in the following points  
4 Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion plays a central role in Prospect Theory and reflects the fact that people 
weigh losses more heavily than gains of the same size. As a result, the utility function, deﬁned 
over gains and losses relative to a reference point, presents a kink at the origin with the slope of 
the loss function steeper than that of the gain function. The ratio of these slopes at the origin is a 
measure of loss aversion. This ratio is generally found to be between 1 and 2.5 with an average 
value in the neighborhood of 2 (Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
1990, Abdellaoui et al., 2007, Booij & van de Kuilen, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Peo-
ple are thus approximately twice as sensitive to losses than they are to absolutely commensurate 
gains. 
As Prospect Theory is a descriptive theory, it does not attempt to explain the phenomenon 
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of loss aversion. There are, however, several psychological and neural explanations. For example, 
Litt et al. (2008) state that loss aversion can be explained by “the combination of arousal modula-
tion of subjective valuation and the increased affective import of losses (which) produces emo-
tionally inﬂuenced orbitofrontal valuations that overweight losses”. Several brain imaging studies 
have suggested that higher sensitivity to loss is due to emotional processes being triggered in cer-
tain parts of the brain such as the amygdala and the anterior insula. For instance Yacubian et al. 
(2006) were “able to confirm ventral striatal responses permitting the local computation of ex-
pected value. However, the ventral striatum only represented the gain-related part of expected 
value. In contrast, loss-related expected value was represented in the amygdala”. 
A different view was presented by Tom et al. (2007) who examined mixed lotteries to 
check whether loss aversion reflects the engagement of distinct emotional processes for potential 
losses: “If loss aversion is driven by a negative affective response (e.g. fear, vigilance, discom-
fort), then one would expect increasing activity in brain regions associated with these emotions 
as the size of the potential loss increases. Contrary to this prediction, no brain regions showed 
significantly increasing activation”. The authors further stated that “a broad set of areas showed 
increasing activity as potential gains increased. Potential losses were represented by decreasing 
activity in several of these same gain-sensitive areas. (This) demonstrates that potential losses 
are represented by decreasing activity in regions that seem to code for subjective value rather 
than by increasing activity in regions associated with negative emotions”. This suggests that a 
single process is responsible for loss aversion. 
McGraw et al. (Kahneman among them) offer an interesting insight into loss aversion in 
their paper “Comparing gains and losses”(2010): “Loss aversion in choice is commonly assumed 
to arise from the anticipation that losses have a greater effect on feelings than gains, but evi-
dence for this assumption in research on judged feelings is mixed. Many situations in which peo-
ple judge and express their feelings lack these features. We argue that loss aversion is present in 
judged feelings when people compare gains and losses and assess them on a common scale. 
When gains and losses are not context for each other, and people can avoid the comparison en-
tirely, the asymmetry fails to appear”. This conclusion can be interpreted as follows. Losses are 
evaluated differently for mixed and loss prospects. In mixed prospects, gains are present, and loss 
aversion is observed. In loss prospects, gains are not present, and loss aversion is not observed.  
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5 Perception Utility Hypothesis 
The evidence presented in the preceding points inevitably leads to the conclusion that the 
single mechanism responsible for loss aversion might be simply the logarithmic perception of 
stimuli. Please note that in logarithmic terms, a 100% profit corresponds to a 50% loss, which 
would result in a sensitivity to losses twice as great as that to gains.  
Using a logarithmic function to assess both gains and losses can therefore explain the loss 
aversion effect and obviate the loss aversion coefficient. However, as the logarithmic function is 
concave over the whole argument domain, this explanation contradicts the Prospect Theory prem-
ise that the value function is convex for losses. The following hypothesis resolves this paradox: 
a) The perception utility is generally described by a logarithmic function, which is steeper for 
losses than for gains (see Figure 5.1); this utility specifically applies to cases where gains ap-
pear in the problem context (either with or without losses). 
 
Figure 5.1 Logarithmic perception utility function (blue). A convex utility for losses (dashed red) is the “re-
flected” part for gains and applies only in the absence of gains. 
b) The perception utility is, however, “reflected” when gains do not appear in the problem con-
text; in this case people invert losses into “gains”, then assess them by the “right-hand” (con-
cave and less steep) part of the logarithmic utility function, and afterwards invert the result 
once again to the loss domain; this process gives the impression that the utility function is 
convex for losses and that it has a curvature similar to that for gains (as Prospect Theory 
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claims). The basic explanation for this “reflection” is that positive numbers are easier to oper-
ate than negative ones. Similarly, many people prefer to use their right hand; however moving 
a task to the right hand is only possible when it is not occupied with another task. 
 
According to the hypothesis presented here, the logarithmic perception of losses and gains 
is the default process and any “reflection” of the perception utility curve for losses is merely an 
exception to the rule. The are several arguments to support this claim.  
First, while most people are risk seeking towards losses, a considerable minority are risk 
averse. This suggests that this latter group perceives losses logarithmically, i.e. it does not “re-
flect” perception utility, even when gains are absent. This perception “misorder” not only ex-
plains the diverging risk attitudes evinced by different subjects, but also the diverging risk atti-
tudes evinced by the same person for different magnitudes of loss.   
Second, any perception utility “reflection” disappears under time constraints. This was ex-
amined by Kocher et al. (2011): “In the baseline condition with no time pressure, our data show 
the common pattern of ‘partial reflection’. There is strong risk aversion for gains, but mild and 
insignificant risk seeking for losses. Under time pressure, we obtain risk aversion for both gains 
and losses, i.e. risk seeking for losses without time pressure turns into risk aversion for losses 
under time pressure”. This pattern seems obvious as the additional brain operations that “reflec-
tion” require take time. Under time pressure, people revert to their basic instincts. 
Third, the described mechanism finds confirmation in brain activity research. Smith et al. 
(2002) report that their results “suggest two disparate, but functionally integrated, choice systems 
with sensitivity to loss: a neocortical dorsomedial system related to loss processing when evalu-
ating risky gambles, and a more primitive ventromedial system related to processing of other 
stimuli. This anatomy suggests that choice under loss generates more use of the calculational 
part of the brain and diminishes the role of visceral representations in the ventromedial system 
which appear to be present under the other conditions”. The hypothesis thus explains the differ-
ent conclusions regarding brain activity. Losses examined separately invoke a more complex sys-
tem, which requires more calculation power. In all other cases (including mixed lotteries like in 
Tom et al., 2007) only the basic system is active.    
Fourth, utility “reflection” disappears when gains are present in the context of losses. This 
view is supported by McGraw et al. (2010), who observe that “loss aversion is present when peo-
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ple compare gains and losses and assess them on a common scale”. In this case, the perception 
utility function is logarithmic over the whole domain. “When gains and losses are not context for 
each other the asymmetry fails to appear”. In this case, utility for losses is often “reflected”, and 
is similar in shape and magnitude to that for gains.  
Fifth, the hypothesis easily explains the gain-loss separabiliy violations discussed in the 
next Point. 
6 Gain-Loss Separability Violations 
Wu and Markle (2007) consider several cases in which gain-loss separability is violated. 
Let us analyze one such case (No. 6 in Table 1 in their paper). The following two choices are 
considered, one concerning gain prospects, the other loss prospects. 
Problem 1 (Gain Prospects): 
H+: $750 with a probability of 0.40 or $0 otherwise [26.4%] 
L+: $500 with a probability of 0.60 or $0 otherwise [73.6%] 
Most participants prefer lottery L+ (choices are presented in brackets). 
Problem 2 (Loss Prospects): 
H-: -$1000 with a probability of 0.60 or $0 otherwise [25.0%] 
L-: -$1500 with a probability of 0.40 or $0 otherwise [75.0%] 
Most participants prefer L-. The above gain and loss prospects are then composed into mixed 
prospects. 
Problem 3 (Mixed Prospects): 
H: $750 with a probability of 0.40 and -$1000 with a probability of 0.60 [51.4%] 
L: $500 with a probability of 0.60 and -$1500 with a probability of 0.40 [48.6%] 
A slight majority of participants prefers H to L in this case. These results violate gain-loss 
separability, which requires that mixed lottery H be preferred to mixed lottery L if the gain por-
tion of H is preferred to the gain portion of L and the loss portion of H is preferred to the loss 
portion of L.  
Wu and Markle try to explain this violation on the basis of probability weighting. The so-
lution has, however, some drawbacks: “Contrary to most previous studies, the (curvature) pa-
rameter for losses was substantially lower than for gains, but most critically, the parameter cap-
turing the difference between single-domain gambles and mixed gambles, was significantly posi-
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tive, indicating a more curved weighting function for mixed gambles than for single-domain 
gambles”. The authors go on to argue that “the observed choice patterns are consistent with a 
process in which individuals are less sensitive to probability differences when choosing among 
mixed gambles than when choosing among either gain or loss gambles”. If true, this would be a 
completely new and hitherto unreported property of probability weighting. The authors also offer 
“an alternative explanation for our observed violations of gain-loss separability that participants 
may be using an ‘extreme outcome heuristic’”. However, “this heuristic, while interesting, 
clearly has less generality than our explanation in terms of diminished sensitivity to probabili-
ties”. 
This change in preference can, however, be easily explained using the hypothesis pre-
sented here. This is done by applying the expected utility formulation without any recourse to the 
probability weighting. In Problem 1, the following condition has to be satisfied:  
 ( ) ( )500 0.60 750 0.40u u>  (6.1) 
As the expected value of both prospects is the same (+$300), the explanation of this pat-
tern only relies on marginal utility diminishing as gain outcomes increase. This is equivalent to 
the concavity of the utility curve for gains. In problem 2, the following condition has to be satis-
fied: 
 ( ) ( )1000 0.60 1500 0.40u u− < −  (6.2) 
As the expected value of both prospects is likewise the same (-$600), the explanation of 
this pattern only relies on the marginal disutility diminishing as loss outcomes increase. This is 
equivalent to the convexity of the utility curve for losses, which demonstrates the utility “reflec-
tion”. 
In problem 3, which is the composition of Problems 1 and 2, the gain portion of H is not 
as good as the gain portion of L, as presented in Problem 1. The explanation of Problem 3 (that H 
is anyhow preferred over L) would thus require the loss portion of H to be much better than the 
loss portion of L: 
 ( ) ( )1000 0.60 1500 0.40u u− >> −  (6.3) 
where “>>” denotes “much more”. This requirement is in strong contradiction with the one de-
manded in Problem 2 (6.2). It requires that utility diminishes quickly as loss outcomes increase, 
i.e. to be a steep and concave function. This is exactly what the logarithmic function looks like. 
This requirement is thus in perfect agreement with the hypothesis presented, viz. that the loga-
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rithmic perception utility function holds over the whole outcome domain when gains are present 
in the problem context. The “reflected” utility only appeared in Problem 2, where gains were not 
considered. 
Please note that the main impact on this paradox has a negative outcome of -1500. In 
Problem 2, where utility for losses is convex due to “reflection”, this outcome does not “look” all 
that bad when compared with an outcome of -1000; therefore it is preferred once respective 
chances are taken into consideration. However in Problem 3, where utility is logarithmic, this 
outcome is much worse than an outcome of -1000 and makes the whole prospect (including its 
more attractive gains) seem inferior. This shows why and how Wu and Markle could come to an 
‘extreme outcome heuristic’ as a possible explanation of the violation. 
This example shows that the recently reported “paradoxes” result from taking convex util-
ity for losses as the rule. The gain-loss separability is indeed violated but this fact finds an easy 
explanation once convex utility for losses is only assumed in the exceptional case where gains do 
not appear in the problem context. 
It is interesting to note that Birnbaum (2007), who analyzed the same violation, came to 
essentially the same solution: “Gambles with strictly nonpositive consequences are calculated by 
substituting absolute values for the consequences in (the general TAX formula) using the same 
parameters and multiplying the resulting positive utility by −1. This assumption implies the 
“reﬂection” property”. On the other hand “mixed gambles, as well as gambles composed of 
strictly nonnegative consequences, are both calculated by substituting algebraic values into the 
(general TAX formula)”. Birnbaum’s reasoning is based on his TAX theory so it differs in many 
other details. Most significantly, Birnbaum assumes a linear utility function for both gains and 
losses, and explains changes in risk attitudes by a probability weighting mechanism; more spe-
cifically by a transfer of weights from higher to lower lottery branches. The essence of his solu-
tion, however, is that loss prospects are calculated differently than gain and mixed ones, and that 
this calculation assumes a double transformation of losses into gains and back into the losses. 
This is also the essence of the hypothesis presented here.   
7 Discussion  
Prospect and Cumulative Prospect Theory define the following characteristics of the value 
function: it is concave for gains and convex for losses, it is described using a power function, loss 
 16 
aversion is modeled using a coefficient λ, and gains and losses are evaluated separately using re-
spective value and probability functions. 
In view of recent experimental results, these postulates cannot be held any longer. This 
paper presents a hypothesis which asserts that perception utility is generally logarithmic in shape 
both for gains and losses. Any “reflection” of the utility curve for losses is merely an exception to 
the rule. Several arguments confirming this statement have been presented. The hypothesis easily 
explains gain-loss separability violations and leads to a different evaluation of mixed prospects 
than that postulated by Cumulative Prospect Theory. Loss aversion is simply a result of applying 
a logarithmic function to both gains and losses. 
Most significantly, the hypothesis presented here establishes a link between psychological 
experiments and financial applications. The latter often consider the compromise between ex-
pected returns and risks offered by prospects (usually mixed ones). These considerations are 
founded on Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952A), the basic theory of financial markets. This the-
ory used the property that if the utility function is locally approximated by the quadratic function, 
then the prospect expected utility value can be approximated by a function depending on mean 
and variance only. The former represents the expected return, the latter the risk associated with it. 
Very obviously the logarithmic function proposed by the present hypothesis can be well ap-
proximated around 0 using the quadratic function for a wide range of positive and negative out-
comes (the logarithmic function was considered by Markowitz himself). This is not the case with 
the Prospect Theory value function which not only presents a kink at the origin but also changes 
its curvature from convex to concave there. The shape of the value function thus breaks all possi-
ble connections between Prospect Theory and Portfolio Theory. This paper shows, however, that 
the shape of the value function proposed by Prospect Theory is incorrect (at least for mixed pros-
pects) and that the perception utility function conforms the basic Portfolio Theory assumption. 
This opens the way for an integrated psycho-financial theory of behavior – something not possi-
ble under the Prospect Theory paradigm.  
This raises the question whether perception utility is able to explain all the behavioral 
paradoxes considered by Prospect Theory. The answer is negative because it only represents the 
bottom layer of a decision making model. Decision Utility Theory (Kontek, 2010, 2009), which 
offers an alternative solution to Cumulative Prospect Theory, distinguishes between perception 
and decision utility. Perception utility is a psychophysical function describing how stimuli, e.g. 
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monetary outcomes, are perceived. The hypothesis regarding the shape of this utility has been 
presented in this paper. Per contra, decision utility describes how these perceived and framed out-
comes are treated when taking risky decisions. It has to be pointed out that the term “decision 
utility” introduced by Kontek is a very different concept from “decision utility” introduced re-
cently by Kahneman (1999). The latter is just another name for the value function. Kontek’s the-
ory postulates a double S-shaped decision utility curve similar to the one hypothesized by 
Markowitz (1952B), and applies the expected decision utility value similarly to the theory by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Perception utility, framing, and decision utility are thus the 
three layers of a multi-layer decision making model (Kontek, 2010, 2009). Interestingly, this so-
lution does not require the probability weighting concept to explain behavioral paradoxes. 
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